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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ENGLISH AND GERMAN PRIZE COURTS
AND PRIZE LAW
By reason of the failure of the nations to set up an inter-
national prize court, 1 the belligerent governments have found
it necessary to continue the practice of employing municipal
courts for the hearing and determination of prize cases. The
organization and procedure of these courts differ materially
in the several countries. 2
According to the ancient practice in England, jurisdiction
in all matters of prize was conferred upon the High Court of
Admiralty by virtue of a special commission issued by the
Crown under the great seal, at the outbreak of war. 3 The
issuance of a special commission, however, did not affect in
the slightest the legal character of the court as one of the
regular tribunals of the country. By the Naval Prize Act of
1864,4 the Court of Admiralty was constituted a permanent
court of prize, independent of any commission issued under
the great seal. A slight change was effected in the reorganiza-
tion of the judicial system under the Supreme Court of judic-
ature Acts of 1873 and 1891. ' The High Court of Justice
was now substituted for the Court of Admiralty as a perman-
ent prize court. In other words, the old Court of Admiralty
was constituted a division of the High Court of Justice, with-
'The Hague Convention of 1907 made provision for the erection
of an' international prize court, but owing to the differences among the
nations in regard to the constitution of the court and the law to be
applied therein, the court has never been called into existence.
The Declaration of London-, 1909, was an unsuccessful attempt to
formulate a uniform body of rules for the international prize court.
Stowell and Munro, International Cases, War and Neutrality, II, p.
488.
2 For a general outline of the procedure of these courts, see Philli-
more, International Law, III, pp. 658-74.3 A brief historical statement of the evolution of the English Prize
Court may be found in the introductory remarks of the Attorney Gen-
eral, Sir John" Simon, at the opening of the Prize Court in 1914. The
Chile, (1914) 31 T. L. R. 3 (4), 1 Trehern, British and Colonial Prize
Cases, 1.
4 L. R. Statutes 27 & 28 Vict. Chap. 25.
5 Anson, Law and Custom of the English Constitution, II, p. 424.
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out in any way affecting its jurisdiction. From the High Court
an appeal lay to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council."
This organization and procedure is of the greatest sig-
nificance to neutrals, inasmuch as their chief protection against
the arbitrary action of the political and naval officers of the
belligerents depends upon the existence and maintenance of
the judicial standing, traditions, and independence of the
courts. If the prize courts are under the control of the execu-
tive department, the decisions of the courts are apt to reflect
the policy of the government, rather than the principles of
justice. In England, fortunately, the independence of the ju-
diciary extends to international as well as civil and constitu-
tional questions. It can scarcely be expected that a national
court, no matter how high-minded its members may be, will
be entirely indifferent in time of war to the interests of its
own nation; but so far as possible English law has endeavored
to guarantee to the neutral a fair and impartial consideration
of his rights of person and property. In a word, the neutral
is put upon the same footing with the citizen of the country
and is entitled to appeal to the highest court of the empire
for the vindication of his rights.
As a prize court is a national court, the qutestion naturally
arises: what law does it apply, municipal or international? 7
The decisions of the English courts upon this point are clear
and emphatic. The commission of the ancient Court of Ad-
miralty expressly provided that the court should "proceed
upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and
reprisals of all ships and goods that are or shall be taken
and to hear and determine according to the course of admir-
alty and the law of nations. 8 The report of the Royal Com-
mission upon the Silesian claims in 1753 0 emphatically an-
nounced that:
G For the history and jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, see An'son, Law and Custom of the English Consti-
tution, II. p. 442. The Judicial Committee is the final court of appeal
for admiralty, ecclesiastical and colonial cases, and for such other
matters as the Crown may choose to refer to it for hearing and con-
sideration. The House of Lords is, with a few exceptions, the court
of final jurisdiction in all other cases.
7 For a detailed discussion of this question, see Picciotto, The Re-
lation of International Law to the Law of England and the United
States.
8 The Chile, (1914) 31 T. L. R. 3, 1 Trehern 1.
0 De Martens, Causes C6lbres, II, 97.
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"All captures at sea as prize in time of war must be judged
of in a court of admiralty according to the law of nations and
particular treaties, where there are any. There never existed
a case where a court, judging according to the laws of England
only, took cognizance of prize .... It never was imagined that
the property of a foreign subject taken as prize in the high
seas could be affected by the laws peculiar to England."
In the case of The Maria, 1°Sir William Scott declared:
"The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, locally here, in
the belligerent country, according to the known law and prac-
tice of nations; but the law itself has no locality."
And in the subsequent case of The Recovery'," he reas-
serted the same fundamental principle:
"In the first place it is to be recollected this is a court of
the law of nations, though sitting here under the authority
of the king of Great Britain. It belongs to other nations as
well as to our own, and what foreigners have a right to demand
from it is the administration of the law of nations simply and
exclusively from our own municipal jurisprudence."
Likewise, during the course of the Boer war, in the case of
West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. The King,"
Lord Alverstone concurred in the general proposition that in-
ternational law was a part of the law of England and as such
would be recognized in all English courts:
"It is quite true that whatever has received the common
assent of civilized nations must have received the assent of our
country, and that to which we have assented along with other
nations in general can properly be called international law
and as such will be acknowledged and applied by our municipal
tribunals when legitimate occasion arises for those tribunals
to decide questions to which doctrines of international law
may be relevant."
The same principle has been enunciated by the prize courts
during the present war. In The Marie Glaeser,13 Sir Samuel
Evans took occasion to pass upon this question incidentally
in the course of a discussion of the legal character of the
Declaration of Paris:
"This court accordingly ought to, and will, regard the De-
claration of Paris not only in the light of rules binding in the
conduct of war, but as a recognized and acknowledged part of
10 (1799) 1 C. Rob. 340, 1 Roscoe, Prize Cases 152.
11 (1807) 6 C. Rob. 341.
12 [1905] 2 K. B. 391, 93 L. T. R. 207, 21 T. L. R. 562.
13 [1914] P. 218 (233), 31 T.L.R. 8 (10), 1 Trehern 38 (55).
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the law of nations, which alone is the law this court has to
administer."
And in the case of The Zamora,14 on appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, Lord Parker laid down:
"The law which the prize court is to administer is not the
national, or, as it is sometimes called, the municipal law, but
the law of nations; in other words, international law. It is
worth while dwelling for a moment on this distinction. Of
course the prize court is a municipal court and its decrees and
orders owe their validity to municipal law. The law which it
enforces may, therefore, in a sense, be considered a branch
of municipal law. Nevertheless, the distinction between mu-
nicipal and international law is well defined. A court which
administers municipal law is bound by and gives effect to the
law as laid down by the sovereign state which calls it into be-
ing. It need inquire only what that law is; but a court which
administers international law must ascertain and give effect to
a law which is not laid down by any particular state, but
originates in practice and usage long observed by civilized
nations in their relations towards each other, or in express
international agreement."
But a further question arises. Suppose that the principles
of international law should come into conflict with an Order
in Council or an act of Parliament; which then would prevail?
In other words, admitting that the courts will enforce the
rules of international law as a general proposition, will they
do so when those rules run counter to municipal ordinances
or legislation? This question has been a thorn in the flesh
for the English prize courts. A s a general rule, they have en-
deavored to avoid the difficulty by denying an actual or pos-
sible conflict between the two, or by adopting a rule of con-
struction which would reconcile the municipal act or ordinance
with the principle of international law. In the case of The
Foxt and others,15"Sir William Scott observed:
"These two propositions, that the court is bound to ad-
minister the law of nations and that it is bound to enforce
the King's orders, are not at all inconsistent with each other,
because these orders and instructions are presumed to conform
themselves under the given circumstances to the principles
of its unwritten law."
In this particular instance the court endeavored to get
around the conflict by holding that the Orders in Council, con-
14 [1916] 2 A. C. 77, 114 L. T. R. 626:2 Trehern 1 (12).
'15 (1811) Edw. 311, 2 Roscoe, Prize Cases 61.
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sidered as a retaliatory measure were in strict conformity
with international law. This question was again raised in
more acute form by the English Orders in Council at the
outbreak of the present European war. It was impossible
this time to evade the isstie. In the case of The Zamora,16 the
Privy Council settled the matter by clearly recognizing the
sovereign power of Parliament to set aside any rule of inter-
national law: 1 7
"It cannot, of course, be disputed that a Prize Court, like
any other court, is botund by the legislative enactments of
its own sovereign State. A British Prize Court would cer-
tainly be bound by acts of the Imperial Legislature. It is none
the less true that if the Imperial Legislature passed an act
the provisions of which were inconsistent with the law of
nations, the Prize Court in giving effect to such provisions
would no longer be administering international law. It would,
in the field covered by such provisions, be deprived of its
proper function as a Prize Court. Even if the provisions of
the act were merely declaratory of the international law, the
authority of the court as an interpreter of the law of nations
Would be thereby materially weakened, for no one could say
whether its decisions were based on a due consideration of
international obligations, or on the binding nature of the
act itself."
But Orders in Council stand upon a different legal basis,
in the judgment of the Privy Council. From the fact that the
prize courts are under a legal obligation to recognize the su-
perior authority of acts of Parliament, it does not follow that,
they are bound by the idministrative actions of the King in
Council:
"The idea that the King in. Council, or indeed any branch
of the Executive, has power to prescribe or alter the law to be
administered by courts -of law in this country is out of har-
mony with the principles of our constitution. It is true that,
under a, number of modern statutes, various branches of the
Executive have power to make rules having the force of
statutes, but all such rules derive their validity from the
16 See note 13, supra.
17 In the original hearing before the Prize Court, Sir Samuel Evans
recognized the binding force of Orders in Council, but at the same
time added, "I atp not called upon to declare what this Court would
or ought to do in an, extreme case, if an Order in Council directed
something to be done which was clearly repugnant to and subversive
of an acknowledged principle of the law of nations." [1916] P. 27
(47), 31 T. L. R. 513 (519), 1 Trehern 309 (331), 9 Am. J. Int. Law
1014.
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st.tute which creates the power, and not from the executive
body by which they are made. No one would contend that the
prerogative involves any power to prescribe or alter the law
administered in courts of common law or equity."
The same principle was clearly applicable in courts of
prize. "The Attorney General," Lord Parker declared, "was
unable to cite any case in which an Order in Council had as
to matters of law been held to be binding on a court of prize."
Under the terms of the Naval Prize Act of 1864, a limited
power of making rules as to the practice or procedure of
prize courts had been conferred upon the King in Council,
but this grant "did not extend to prescribing or altering the
law to be administered by the court, but merely to give such
executive directions as might from time to time have been
necessary." The conclusion, therefore, in The Zacn ora ca-se 18
was that a British Order in Council authorizing the requisi-
tion of certain contraband articles, pending a decision of the
prize court, was not binding upon the court. According to
the express terms of its commission, the court was required
to administer the rules of international law, and that re-
quirement could not be waived by the court at the instance
of the executive in the absence of express legislative au-
thorization.
The decision in this case is significant, both from a con-
stitutional and international standpoint, though its constitu-
tional value is undoubtedly the greater. The Judicial Com-
mittee has reasserted the well-known constitutional principle
of the rule of the ordinary law. 29 It has placed a salutary
restriction upon the tendency of the executive to extend the
ordinance making power in time of war. The rights of neu-
trals and citizens alike have beeh protected against arbitrary
action on the part of the Crown. At the same time the court
has unmistakably accepted the complementary principle of
parliamentary sovereignty. 20 An act of Parliament is the
supreme law in England. The neutral may appeal to the
courts against any invasion of his rights by the Crown, but
he has no legal protection against the arbitrary legislation of
Parliament. In the latter eventuality he must look to his.
18 See note 13, supra.
19 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, Chap. IV.
20 Ibid. Chap. I.
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own government to support his just claims by diplomatic
representations, or, if necessary, by force. Parliament, it is
true, as a deliberative body, is much less likely to encroach
upon neutral rights than is an executive department, but this
is small satisfaction to the neutral in case of an actual invasion
of his rights. 21 He is not interested in the constitutional
aspect of the question; the distinction between acts of Parlia-
ment and ordinances is of no concern to him. What he de-
mands is the vindication of his rights as established by inter-
national law; but at present this right may be legally denied
by act of Parliament and that denial will be upheld by the
courts.
By the Prize Act of 1884 22 the constitution of the German
prize courts is left to the determination of the Imperial
Government. The organization thus provided is essentially
different from that of the English courts. Preliminary pro-
ceedings are conducted before a prize board. There are two
prize courts, located at the chief naval centers, Hamburg and
Kiel. Each of the courts consists of five judges, of whom the
president and one member are chosen from the legal pro-
fession. Of the remaining members one is a naval officer,
and the other two are laymen representing the shipping and
mercantile interests respectively. The Imperial Government
is represented by a special commissioner. Cases are carried,
on appeal, to the, Supreme Court of Prize at Berlin. This
court is made up of seven judges, three of whom are lawyers,
one a naval officer, one a representative of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, and the other two are lay judges. 23
In this elaborate organization may be seen a typical ex-
ample of a German administrative court. According to con-
tinental usage, courts are divided into two branches,-ordinary
and administrative courts,-each with its own organization
jurisdiction, and principles of law. Private controversies are
heard in the ordinary courts, but questions of a public nature,
or those in any way affecting the bureaucracy, are reserved
for the determination of the administrative courts. 24 The
21 Scott. British Orders in. Council and International Law. 10 Am.
J. Int. Law 560..22 Huberich and King, German Prize Code, Introduction, p. xiv.
22 Ibid. p. xvi.
24 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 315.
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prize courts, as might be expected, belong to the system of
administrative courts. One of the characteristic features of
these courts is the important role which is played by the
non-professional members. To the Anglo-Saxon jurist there is
a strange incompatibility of functions in the presence of naval
and political officers upon the bRnch. In theory, at least, the
courts are free from governmental control, and in actual prac-
tice it must be admitted that they have manifested a marked
degree of independence; 2 but war conditions are exceptional.
National patriotic feeling runs high. The members of the
prize court are put to the severest test of judicial impartiality.
In such circumstances it would be surprising indeed if the
bureaucratic traditions of the members did not reassert them-
selves. Some of the recent decisions 26 of the German prize
courts tend to confirm this suspicion of strong national feeling.
The Prussian official, rather than the international jurist has
been in evidence. 27
The procedure in the German prize courts is simple and
exceptionally favorable to enemy interests. The owner of a
ship or cargo and any other persons interested in the same
have the right to appear as claimants, either in person or by
attorney. 28
"Alien enemies have the same right to appear or be repre-
sented as other persons. If no claim is interposed, the court
proceeds to a determination of the case on the basis of the
25 Ashley, Local and Central Government, 309.
20 See notes, 39, 40, 41.
2T A recent article by Dr. Joseph Kohler on The New Law of
Nations brings out the bitterness of national feeling of one of the
greatest international jurists. He denies the very possibility of a re-
establishment of legal relations with the chief enemies of Germany.
"An International Law based on international treaties can no longer
be. International association can only lead to forms of law if the
people are actuated by legal endeavors. Treaties with liars and fal-
sifiers cannot form sources of law; only those peoples can co-operate
in- the development of law who have a living conscience." Inter-
national law in his opinion can only be developed by German scholars
through a rational conception of "an, historical Law of Nature." "Of
course International Law is not a conceptual science in the sense of a
speculation' wholly divorced from actualities which we wish to en-
throne, but a science which draws its guiding principles from the ob-
servation of life and its rational culture-aims, forms them into con-
ceptions, 'and out of the conceptions constructs the particulars of law.
This is German science, for German science alone has been able to
work in systematic fashion." Zeitschrift ffir V61kerrecht, Septem-
ber. 1915. .Translated in' 14 Mich. L. Rev. 631 (635).
28 Huberich and King, German Prize Code, Introduction. p. xvi.
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claims submitted by the Imperial commissioner. . . . Pro-
ceedings in all the courts are ptiblic."
The most striking feature of this procedure is the liberality
of the treatment extended to alien enemies. According to
German law, the mere outbreak of war does not entail a ces-
sation of all legal or commercial relations. Neither does an
alien enemy lose his standing in a German court. It has
even been held that a member of the armed forces of the
enemy can proceed with the prosecution of his claims as in
time of peace. Some express action on the part of the execu-
tive or legislative departments is required to deprive the alien
of his privileged status.
The liberality of this procedure stands out in marked con-
trast to the narrow tenet of the English courts. By common
law an alien enemy was practically an outlaw. 29 Even
though domiciled in England,-he could not sue unless pro-
tected by some act of public authority that discharged him
from the character of an enemy and put him within the
King's peace pro hac vice. 30 So severe, indeed, was the rule,
that in the case of ransom contracts the alien enemy was not
permitted to sue in his own name, but payment was enforced
by an action brought by the imprisoned hostage, or his rela-
tives, in his own home court for the recovery of his freedom. 31
In the case of The Troia,32 during the Crimean war, Dr. Lush-
ington laid down the same hard and fast principle of the
common law:
"I entertain no doubt as to the correct practice in such
cases: it is that when an alien enemy claims, he must show
a persona standi in judicio: the law being that an alien enemy
is not entitled in any way to sue in this or any other court."
But the severity of the common law has been gradually
relaxed in the interests of international commerce and good
faith. As early as the seventeenth century it was held that
a license to an alien enemy to reside in England conferred
29 In Sylvester's Case, (1701) 7 Mod. 150, the court held: "If an
alien enemy come into England without the Queen's protection, he
shall be seized and imprisoned by the law of England and he shall
have no advantage of the law of England nor for any wrong done to
him here."3o The Hoop, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 196. 1 Roscoe, Prize Cases 104.
31 Ibid. The Charming Nancy. (1761) Marsden's Adm. Cases 398.
• (1954) 1 Spinks E. & A. 342.
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upon such alien the rights and status of an alien friend. "
This concession has been extended during the present war to
cover all aliens who have duly registered under the Aliens'
Registration Act. 34 but the common law courts have refused
to remove the disability in the case of alien'enemies resident
abroad. 35 The lprize court, on the other hand, has been much
more broad-minded in its treatment of the claims of alien
enemies. In the case of The Moewe, 3 6 soon After the outbreak
of war, Sir Samuel Evans frankly admitted the necessity of
relaxing the ancient procedure of the court regarding aliens
in order to bring English practice more nearly into line with
the more liberal principles laid down by the prize courts of the
United States, Japan, and Rus~ia during the course of the
Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars:
"I will now consider whether the owners of an enemy
vessel have a right, or should be given the right, to appear to
put forward a claim under the conventions, assuming, as was
done during the argument, that they are operative. Dealing
with the Hague Conventions as -a whole, the court is faced
with the problem of deciding whether a uniform rule as to the
right of an enemy owner to'.appear ought to prevail in all
cases of claimants who may be entitled to protection or relief,
whether partial or otherwise. Mr. Holland argued that this is
a matter not of international law, but of the practice of this
court. That view is correct. I think that this court has the
inherent power of regulating and prescribing its own practice,
unless fettered by enactment. Lord Stowell from time to time
made rules of practice, and his power to do so was not ques-
tioned. Moreover, by Order XLV of the Prize Court Rules,
1914, it is laid down that in all cases not provided for by
those rules the practice of the late High Court of Admiralty
of England in prize proceedings should be followed, or such
other practice as the president may direct. The rules do not
provide for the case now arising. I therefore assume that
as president of this court I can give directions as to the
practice in such cases as that with which the court is now
dealing.
"The practice should conform to sound ideas of what
is fair and just. A merchant who is a citizen of an enemy
country would not unnaturally expect that when the state
. Wells v. Williams, (1698) 1 Ld. Raymond 282, 1 Salk. 46.
-4 Princess of Thurn and Taxis v. Moffit. (1914) 112 L. T. R. 114.
35 Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] " K. B. 857, 112 L. T. R. 313, 31 T. L. R.
162.
.16 [1915] P. 1, 31 T. L. R. 46. 9 Am. J. Int. Law 547.
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to which he belongs, and other states with which it may
unhappily be at war, have bound themselves by formal and
solemn conventions dealing with a state of war like those
formulated at the Hague in 1907, he should have the benefit
of the provisions of such international compacts. He might
equally naturally expect that he would be heard in cases
where his property or interests were affected as to the effect
and results of such compacts upon his individual position.
It is to be remembered also that in the international commerce
of our day the ramifications of the shipping business are mani-
fold; and others concerned, like underwriters or insurers,
would feel a greater sense of fairness and security if, through
an owner (though he be an enemy), the case for a seized or
captured vessel were permitted to be independently placed
before the court.
"From the considerations to which I have adverted, I deem
it fitting, pursuant to powers which I think the court pos-
sesses, to direct that the practice of the court shall be that
whenever an alien enemy conceives that he is entitled to any
protection. privilege, or relief under any of th*e Hague Con-
ventions of 1907, he shall be entitled to appear as a claimant,
and to argue his claim before this court. The grounds of his
claim would be stated in the affidavit before appearance which
is required to be filed by Order III, Rule 5. of the Prize Court
Rules, 1914."
But even this concession falls far short of the. liberality of
the German law in this respect. The arbitrary procedure of
the old common law, it must be admitted, is an anachronism
in this day and generation. An alien enemy is no longer con-
sidered an outlaw. Both custom and convention have guaran-
teed to him certain immnities for his property captured on
the high seas. A like immunity should be extended to him in
the courts of the belligerent country.
"It is doubtful.". says Mr. Norman Bentwick. ", "whether
the old common law rule excluding alien enemies from sue-
ing in the King's courts during the war might not be com-
pletely abrogated in our day without 4ny injury to the public
weal. The change would require legislation, but it is submitted
that legislation with this aim would bring our law into more
complete accord with the progressive ideas of international
law. There may be circumstances under which the denial of
the right of action involves loss of property, and the spirit of
the modern law of war is that proprietary rights of enemies
in the belligerent country are to be preserved during the
war. What the interests of the belligerent state demand is
3 Bentwick, Treatment of Alien Enemies. 9 Am. J. Int. Law 642.
ENGLISH AND GERMAN PRIZE COURTS
that no wealth should be sent to any person in the enemy
territory, and it would therefore be necessary to require any
sum awarded by judgment to an alien enemy to be paid into
court. But it would be possible to secure this condition while
leaving the courts open in war as in peace to do justice be-
tween all persons who have rights to assert or defend."
The liberality of German procedure in respect to alien
enemies is, however, more than offset by the attitude of the
German prize courts towards the principles of international
law, According to recent decisions, the primary function of
the prize court is to enforce the laws and ordinances of the
empire in respect to the conduct of naval operations. The
prize courts look to their own government for legal guidance
and not to the principles of international law. 31 In'short, the
courts are not only administrative courts, but they also apply
administrative law. In the case of The Batavia T/', 39 the prize
court at Hamburg lays down:
"A part of the claimants have in the oral proceedings given
expression to the view that prize courts have to apply inter-
national, not national, law and especially not the contents of
the German Prize Ordinance of September 13, 1909, since this
does not have the character of a rule of law.
"This is not the case.
"The prize courts are national courts. They are established
by their state to determine whether the legal standards to
which the naval organs should adhere according to their in-
structions are observed or not, and to declare their conclusions
thereon. From their purpose it follows that they have to judge
according to the law established by their state, whether or
not it agrees with the principles of international law. Whether
this is the case is not the affair of prize courts to judge, but
of the belligerent states, which alone are answerable therefor,
to other states. The principle sustained by statements of the
older literature, that prize courts have to apply international
law even if it does not agree with their national law is then
thrown out on fundamental principles .... They (prize courts)
would also be unable practically to carry such principles into
operation, for the content of so-called principles of interna-
tional law is in many cases uncertain and not determined.
So far as this is not the case, they might have lost their
applicability as a consequence of the relations of the belliger-
38Wright.. Destruction of Neutral Property on Enemy Vessels,
11 Am. J. Int. Law 362.
39 Preisengericht Hamburg, June 1, 1915, Dutch Orange Book, Oct.
1, 1915, p. 106.
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ents or through the alteration of their actual provisions. It
cannot be expected, for instance, of a belligerent party, whose
opponent has broken an international agreement although it
was concluded expressly for the event of war, to hold to it and
to prescribe a further observance of it to his prize courts.
And it needs no proof that certain principles previously valid
as customary international law may become obsolete through
the development of new forms of naval procedure, such as
the submarine."
The law which the courts must apply is, then, municipal
law as set forth in the Imperial Prize Ordinance of September
13, 1909.
"It is not true," the court continues, "that this is exclusively
an instruction for the naval commanders.. The introduction
('I approved the following prize ordinance and decree...')
and especially a part of its contents which can. relate not to
the acts of commanders, but only to those of prize courts, as
that concerning the guarantee of compensation, (Articles 8,
121, paragraph 3) and that concerning condemnation, (Articles
17, 41, 42) prove the contrary."
The same principle is affirmed by the Supreme Prize Court
at Berlin in the case of The Elida:40
"The prize regulations contain the principles laid down
by the Kaiser as commander-in-chief within his imperial jurist
diction for the practice of prize law pertaining to naval warfafg
and are, therefore, primarily law not only for the navy but also
for the inland authorities, particularly prize courts in so far.
as they have to- pass upon the legality of the action of com--
manders at sea falling within the prize law.
"International law only lays down rights and duties as be.:
tween different states. The prize courts, when judging of the
legality of prize actions, can tAke general international prin-
ciples only into account when the prize regulations contain no
instructions and, therefore, tacitly refer io the principles of.
international law. Therefore, the question whether an in-
struction of the prize regulations agrees with general inter,
national law is not for the prize court to decide. If a con-
tradiction in this connection is asserted, the point in contrb-
versy is to be settled in another manner:"
The same doctrine has been maintained in subsequent
cases, 41 with some slight modifications. According to these
decisions, the German prize courts accept the supremacy of an
40 Oberpreisengericht Berlin, May 18, 1915, 9 Zeitschrift ffir V61-
kerrecht 109, 10 Am. J. Int. Law 916.
41 The Glitra, (1915) 10 Am. J. Int. Law 921; The Maria, (1915)
ibid. 927; The Indian Prince, (1916) ibid. 930.
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imperial ordinance without question. The principles of inter-
national law only come in for secondary consideration, in case
the imperial government fails to lay down a rule covering the
particular matter. In short, a rescript of the Kaiser or the
Bundesrath is more authoritative than all the rules of inter-
national law. The prize courts do not consider themselves, as
in England, an independent and co-ordinating branch of the
government. They are but humble agents for the execution
of the national law. They are not the guardians of neutral
rights, but the champions of German interest. Under such
conditions, neutral rights exist only by sufferance. In a word,
international law has likewise been reduced to a mere "scrap
of paper" and in this case not by the armies of Germany, but
by the courts. 42 Should such a doctrine prevail, the German
prize courts may become a more dangerous foe of world-wide
liberty than the lawless submarine or the faithful legions of
Von Hindenburg. The courts, in truth, would lend their
legal sanction to those acts which an imperial chancellor could
only defend on the ground of national necessity.
Against this condition of international lawlessness the
world must present a united protest. The national prize courts
have failed to afford adequate pTotection to neutral interests
or the just claims of the hostile belligerents. Some means
must be found of restricting both the national sovereignty
of Parliament and the despotic authority of the Kaiser in in-
ternational relations. Here is a question of world organiza-
tion; it affects all nations alike. The tenets of national sover-
eignty must be qualified in the interests of world peace and jus-
tice. The principles of international law must be more clearly
and firmly established, and henceforth these principles must
have an international sanction and interpretation. The erection
of an international court of prize was a feeble recognition of the
need for an impartial world tribunal. Unfortunately, the court
has only existed on paper. The nations should see to it that
a real and effective international tribunal is called into exist-
ence to which neutrals and belligerents can appeal with equal
confidence of a fair and dispassionate hearing. When that day
comes we may look forward to the gradual development of a
42 Reeves, The New Law of Nations, (Foreword) 14 Mich. L. Rev.
631.
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uniform body of international prize law in place of the con-
flicting decisions and discriminatory practice of the existing
national courts. 43
C. D. ALLIN,
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
43 Scott, British Qrders in Council and International Law, 10 Am.
J. Int. Law 568.
